10/28/2014 Update: I will be going to Sierra Leone instead of Liberia.
I suspect that many people who know me know some of the reasons I have chosen to work in the Ebola
response in Liberia; I fell in love with Africa and its people during my first
trip to the continent in the late 1980s, I became a nurse because I wanted to
work in Africa, I have a passion for public health and tropical medicine, I'm
Catholic, and I want to set an example for my son.
There is another reason that
requires some explaining.
Basic reproduction
number (R0)
The basic reproduction number, or R0 (pronounced
"R-naught"), is the number of people who can be expected to be
infected by a single person with a disease in a susceptible population (a
population in which there is no immunity to the disease). For example, Fraser
and colleagues (2009)
estimated the R0 for 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza to be 1.4 to 1.6,
meaning that at the beginning of the pandemic, each person infected with 2009
H1N1 could be expected to infect 1.5 other people. In the pre-vaccine era, the
R0 for measles was 12.5 to 18; each person with measles could be
expected to infect up to 18 other people.
The reproduction number does not remain the same during an
epidemic; it becomes R(t), where t is time. The reproduction number
decreases as the number of susceptible individuals in a population decreases
through death, outmigration, or immunity. Changes in behavior can also influence
the reproduction number. An important point is that epidemics end when the R(t)
is less than 1; that is, each infected person infects fewer than one person. We
do not have sustained measles transmission in the U.S. because of high levels
of immunity from immunization; the R0 for measles in the U.S. is
less than 1.
The World Health Organization Ebola Response Team (2014) estimated
the current reproductive number for Liberia to be 1.51. The authors estimated
that the number of people infected will double every 23.6 days. Meltzer et al.
(CDC, 2014)
estimated the doubling time for Liberia to be between 15 to 20 days.
Interrupting Ebola
transmission
Ebola is transmitted through contact with the body fluids of
a person who has Ebola virus disease (EVD). There are few health care
facilities and few health care workers available in the affected countries to
provide care for people with Ebola, so people who are sick with the disease
have been cared for at home where their families are exposed and become
infected. Health care facilities frequently lack supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE), so health care workers have been getting
infected and some have fled out of fear of being infected. Ebola is also
transmitted during traditional funeral ceremonies.
Getting a person with EVD isolated and into treatment
prevents transmission to other people, which reduces the R(t). People
who survive EVD develop high levels of antibodies to the virus and are presumed
to be immune to the species of the virus with which the individual was
infected, reducing the R(t). Finding people with EVD though contact tracing and getting them into isolation and treatment reduces the R(t).
Safe burial practices reduce the R(t).
These interventions, isolating and treating people with EVD,
contact tracing, and facilitating safe burial practices require personnel who
are able to care for people with the disease and work with communities to
change behaviors that place people at risk for infection.
That is why I'm going to Liberia.
This epidemic began as a relatively small outbreak in Guinea
in December, 2013. The WHO Ebola ResponseTeam found that the reproduction number in Guinea fluctuated between March
and July 2014, a time when control efforts could have quickly brought an end to
this epidemic. Both the WHO Ebola Response Team and the CDC authors
concluded that delays in responding to this epidemic cost lives. Soon, there
could be thousands of new cases every week instead of hundreds.
Supporting health
care workers
Holly has been very supportive of my decision to work in
Liberia. I would not have accepted the position without her approval. I am
fortunate that my colleagues at the health department have also been supportive
of my decision.
According to the current CDC recommendations, health care workers who wore appropriate PPE while
caring for patients with EVD are not considered to be at high risk for
infection. The CDC recommends that people entering to the U.S. from countries
affected by the Ebola epidemic self-monitor for fever and symptoms of EVD for
21 days (the incubation period). The CDC has not recommended isolating
asymptomatic contacts of cases.
As I was writing this, the news media reported that New York
Governor Andrew Cuomo and New Jersey Governor Chris Christie ordered 21 day mandatory
quarantine of everyone entering those states from Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra
Leone.
I have heard that doctors and nurses who return from working
in West Africa are facing being furloughed for three weeks by their employers and that
some health care professionals who had planned to go to West Africa to work in
the Ebola response have cancelled those plans as a result.
These actions are, in my opinion, based on fear and not on
objective evaluations of the risk that a health care worker will infect others
in this country. Hundreds, if not thousands of expatriate health care
professionals from around the world have responded to this epidemic, very few
expatriate health care professionals have been infected, and none of those
infected health care professionals has transmitted the virus to anyone in their
home countries. I would not have decided to go to Liberia if I did not believe
that my risk of being infected was negligible and the risk of me transmitting
Ebola to Holly and Andrew was nonexistent.
While I understand the public's fear of this disease, I also
realize that we live in a global community. The risk of Ebola importation to
the U.S. and other countries outside of Africa increases with the duration of
this epidemic and with the number of people infected with the virus. We have
already seen the result of failure to recognize and respond to this threat; what
began as a relatively small, isolated outbreak has become a multinational
epidemic.
I encourage other health care professionals to consider
working in West Africa to hasten the end of this epidemic. I encourage employers
and politicians to provide incentives for health care professionals to work
in West Africa for the sake of our global community rather than place
unnecessary and poorly-considered burdens on their shoulders.
I thank my family and my colleagues at the health department
for their support.
I have not yet seen my itinerary, but I am scheduled to be
in Anniston, Alabama for CDC safety training November 3 – 5. I will be deployed
to Liberia from there. I hope to be home for Christmas.
References
Fraser, C., Donnelly, C. A., Cauchemez, S., Hanage, W. P.,
Van Kerkhove, M. D., Déirdre, T. et
al. (2000). Pandemic potential of a strain of influenza A (H1N1): early
findings. Science, 324(5934), 1557-1561.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3735127.
Strebel, P. M., Papania, M. J., Dayan, G. H., & Halsey,
N. A. (2008). Measles vaccine. In S. A. Plotkin, W. A. Orenstein, & P. A.
Offit (Eds.) Vaccines, 5th
Ed. [Electronic version]. Elsevier.
White, P. J. & Enright, M. C. (2010). Mathematical
models in infectious disease epidemiology. In J. Cohen, S. M. Opal, & W. G.
Powderly (Eds). Infectious diseases,
3rd Ed. [Electronic version]. Elsevier.
World Health Organization Ebola Response Team. (2014). Ebola
virus disease in West Africa – the first 9 months of the epidemic and forward
projections. New England Journal of
Medicine, 371(16), 1481-1495. http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa1411100.